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CENVTRA L BA NK op DENvR v. Fzis~ TAERS TA 7E'BA A w
PRUNING THE JUDICIAL OAK BY SEVERING THE AIDING
AND ABETTING BRANCH

Congress and those charged with enforcement of the securities laws stand
forewarned that unresolved questions concerning the scope of [private
10(b)] causes of action are likely to be answered by the Court in favor of
defendants'
INTRODUCTION

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful to use deceptive devices or make misleading statements "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." Under section 10(b), private
actions have been said to represent a "judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn," 2 as courts increasingly have accorded
leniency to such actions. For nearly three decades, lower federal courts
have allowed private parties to bring suit based on aiding and abetting
claims pursuant to section 10(b). 3 Over the same time period, the
Supreme Court has declined to rule on the validity of such claims. 4 The
Supreme Court's silence recently ended with its decision in CentralBank v.
First Interstate Bank,5 which held that the conduct proscribed by section
10(b) does not include aiding and abetting a primary violator. Consequently, private parties no longer can maintain suits based on such
claims. 6 The Court's holding overrules substantial lower court precedent
allowing aiding and abetting liability. This decision illustrates the continuation of the Contraction Era of securities law7 and for the time being halts
8
causes of action based on aiding and abetting section 10(b) violations.
1. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1115 (1991) (KennedyJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
de3. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert.
nied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673
(N.D. Ind. 1966).
4. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.7 (1976).
5. 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994).
6. Id.
7. The term "Contraction Era" refers to the post-1975 decisions in which courts denied,
restricted, and criticized implied private causes of action under the securities laws. See Alan
Fraud: A Critical
Examination,
R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities
52 ALa. L. Rav. 637, 648 n.64 (1988).
8. Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
both announced their disapproval of the Court's decision. Senator Dodd declared the Court
"has laid down the gauntlet for Congress." SEC Advocates Legislation toPreserve Section 10(b)
26 Sc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 691, 691 (May 13, 1994). Senator
Aiding and Abetting Liability,
Metzenbaum, deeming the Court's reasoning "bizarre," introduced the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Amendment Act of 1994 in response. 140 CONG. Rac. S9460 (daily ed. July 21,
1994).
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This Comment analyzes the Court's decision in Central Bank. Part I
examines the historical development of aiding and abetting liability and
the judicially conservative trend of recent Supreme Court decisions in the
securities law arena. Part II provides the factual background, procedural
history, and majority and dissenting rationales of Central Bank. Part III
analyzes the Court's decision. The analysis praises the majority's judicial
restraint, criticizes the dissent's reliance on suspect methods of statutory
construction, and discusses possible implications of the decision. The
larger policy issue of whether aiding and abetting liability might serve as a
valuable addition to section 10(b) is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Though aiding and abetting liability may be desirable to some commentators, this Comment takes the position that section 10(b), as it currently
reads, cannot and should not be construed to allow such liability.
I.

BACKGROUND

In the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent economic depression, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933
("1933 Act") 9 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). 1 0
Congress passed the Acts to protect investors from fraudulent conduct in
connection with securities transactions,1 1 thereby substituting a philoso12
phy of full disclosure for the prevailing philosophy of caveat emptor.
Together, the Acts create an extensive scheme of liability, with the 1933
Act regulating initial distribution of securities and the 1934 Act regulating
3
post-distribution trading.'
The use of aiding and abetting liability by private parties has proliferated in recent years, becoming the most important secondary liability doctrine used in section 10(b) actions. 14 Prior to Central Bank, many
commentators felt the doctrine had become so established that the
Supreme Court would never reject it.15 Other commentators and courts
questioned the validity of private aiding and abetting claims given the
Supreme Court's restrictive textual approach to securities law in recent
16
years.
9. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 a-77aa (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11. Cheryl L. Pollak, Comment, Rule 10b-5 Liability After Hochfelder: Abandoning the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 218, 218 (1977).
12. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
13. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1445 (1994).
14. Thomas L. Riesenberg, Supreme Court to Examine Aiding and Abetting Liability Under
Rule 10b-5, 7 INsIrHrs, no. 8, August 1993, at 34. In the past, aiding and abetting liability was
used almost exclusively by the SEC. More recently, almost every private § 10(b) action contains an aiding and abetting claim. Id.
15. See, e.g., William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, ControllingPerson, and Agency: Common-Law Principlesand the Statu-

tory Scheme, 14J. CoRe. L. 313, 315-18 (1988).
16. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, passim.
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AIDING AND ABETfNG

Primaiy Violations and Aiding and Abetting under Section 10(b)

Section 10(b) prohibits the use of deception or manipulation, as specified by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 Pursuant to the authority
granted in section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule lob-5, which requires
traders to either disclose inside information or abstain from trading based
8
on such information.'
While the text of section 10(b) does not provide for a private right of
action, courts have inferred such a right based on the maxim ubi jus ibi
remedium, which is to say, where there is a right there is a remedy.19 In a
suit based on a section 10 (b) violation, a purchaser or seller 20 of any security can bring a claim against any person engaged in manipulation 2 ' or
deception in connection with the purchase or sale of the security. 22 For
the claim to succeed, the plaintiff must satisfy three judicially created
thresholds. First, the defendant must have engaged intentionally or knowingly in manipulative or deceptive conduct 23 on which the plaintiff re17. Securities Exchange Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988). Section 10 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection the with purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. Section 10 is a catchall provision, "but what it catches must be fraud." Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). The Rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Throughout this Comment, the author refers to § 10(b); however, any construction limiting conduct actionable under § 10(b) also limits Rule lOb-5 because the Rule gains its authority from § 10(b). Rulemaking authority granted to an agency gives it the power to adopt
regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress, not the power to make law. Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976).
19. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
20. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975) (illustrating the history of lower federal court holdings allowing only actual purchasers and sellers
to sue under § 10(b)).
21. In the securities law context, "manipulation" is a term of art referring to practices
such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that artificially affect market activity.
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
22. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
23. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). The Court also rejected
negligence as a basis for liability. Id. at 199; see also Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222,
228 (1980) (holding omissions to be actionable only if defendant had a duty to disclose);
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (limiting the conduct actionable to misstatements or omissions of material facts and manipulation of securities pricing).
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lied.2 4 Second, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct
proximately caused an injury.2 5 Finally, the defendant must have used the
United States mail, a national security exchange, or interstate commerce
26
to further the manipulation or deception.
Additional judicial construction of the section eventually expanded
liability and allowed for private actions based on a defendant aiding and
abetting the primary violator. 27 This construction of the section resulted
in defrauded investors suing banks, 28 accountants, 29 lawyers, 30 underwriters,3 1 and stock exchanges3 2 due to the typical insolvency of the primary
33
violators in the wake of failed securities schemes.
In contrast to the judicially implied private right of action for section
10(b) violations, several sections of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act expressly
provide for private remedial measures. 3 4 However, none of these sections
provide for aiding and abetting liability. While none of the sections provide an express private remedy for aiding and abetting, other sections of
both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act provide for secondary liability in the
form of "controlling person" liability.3 5 The 1934 Act allows the SEC to

censure or restrict the activities of persons associated with a broker24. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). Along with finding reliance a requirement, the Court also clarified the definition of materiality in regard to reliance as the
"substantial likelihood that the disclosure or the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." Id.at 231 (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)); see also Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (holding plaintiff need not show
reliance when basing action on an omission).
25. See Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256, 1261 (4th Cir. 1993); In re
Control Data Corp. Securities Litigation, 983 F.2d 616, 618 (8th Cir. 1991); Harris v. Union
Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 362 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986).
26. Perez-Rubio v. Wyckoff, 718 F. Supp. 217, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
27. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind.
1966).
28. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
29. See, e.g., H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979).
31. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
32. See, e.g., Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
33. See John T. Vangel, Note, A Complicity-Doctrine Approach to Section 10(b) Aiding and
Abetting Civil Damages Actions, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 180, 180 (1989).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988) (creating private cause of action for false statements or
omissions in registration statements); 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988) (same for the sale of securities
by way of a material misstatement or omission); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988) (same for manipulative practices, e.g., wash sales and matched orders); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988) (same
against owners, officers, and directors who engage in short-swing trading); 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1988) (same for misleading statements in forms filed with the SEC). In contrast to the
express rights of action granted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the Commodity Exchange Act
expressly provides for a private cause of action based on aiding and abetting a violator. 7
U.S.C. § 25(b)(3) (1988).
35. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988) (providing for "controlling person" liability, unless such person "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is
alleged to exist"); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988) (providing for
controlling person liability with the same 'good faith' exception).
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dealer3 6 who willfully aid and abet or otherwise induce a securities violation by another.3 7 In addition to the foregoing express provisions for secondary liability, the 1934 Act imposes supervisory duties on exchanges and
38
clearing agencies.
The first case to address aiding and abetting liability in the securities
arena, SEC v. Timetrnst, 39 illustrates its criminal law antecedents. The SEC
alleged that Timetrust had engaged in a scheme to defraud purchasers of
securities 40 and that Timetrust had done so with the "aid and abetment"
of others. 4 ' In deciding whether the SEC could invoke properly an injunction based on aiding and abetting a securities violation of section
17(a), the court noted that the Criminal Code of the United States provided for aiding and abetting liability in a criminal proceeding. 4 2 The
court then concluded that "no good reason appears why this same rule
should not apply in an injunctive proceeding to restrain a violation of the
43
same statute."
The landmark decision allowing civil liability for aiding and abetting a
violation of section 10(b) came in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance.44 The district court relied on tort law principles to allow a private
action based on an aiding and abetting theory. In Brennan,Dobich Securities Corporation, from whom the plaintiffs had purchased defendant corporation's stock, used a short selling scheme 45 to create an artificially high
market price for the stock. 46 The plaintiffs alleged that Midwestern knew
of Dobich's conduct but permitted it to continue by failing to report
Dobich to the SEC. 47 The plaintiffs argued that by failing to report the
improper activity, the defendants "knowingly and purposely encouraged
an artificial build-up in the market for its stock." 48 As a result of such
aiding and abetting, Midwestern "was allegedly in a more favorable posi49
tion for potential mergers" being negotiated.
36. "Broker-dealer" is a term of art referring to a securities brokerage firm. BLACK'S LAW
193 (6th ed. 1990).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1988). Pursuant to authority granted by the Investment
Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act, the SEC also has authority to discipline investment advisers who aid or abet a securities law violation. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9(b)(3), 80b3(e)(5) (Supp. IV 1992).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78q (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
39. 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
40. Id. at 37.
41. Id. at 43.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
45. Short selling occurs when a seller contracts for the sale of stock the seller does not
own, "so as to be available for delivery at the time when, under rules of the exchange, delivery must be made." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1379 (6th Ed. 1990). Short selling is not illegal
in and of itself, but in Brennan Dobich did not cover (buy and deliver) as the rules required.
Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 675.
46. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 675.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
DICTONARY
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Midwestern attacked the complaint by challenging the aiding and
abetting theory, contending section 10(b) did not provide authority for
the claim and that the legislative history indicated that Congress chose not
to proscribe aiding and abetting.50 The district court rejected Midwestern's contentions, reasoning courts had allowed private section 10(b) actions based on general principles of tort law and that these same
principles should guide the construction of section 10(b) with respect to
the issue of aiding and abetting liability. 5 1 The court relied on the Restatement of Torts section 876, stating that principles formulated therein
are the "logical and natural complement" to a section 10(b) implied right
52
of action.
Other courts ultimately followed Brennan's rationale and similarly relied on tort law to hold peripheral defendants liable as aiders and
53
abettors.
All federal courts of appeals considering whether aiding and abetting
liability exists under section 10(b) have concluded that it does. 54 The majority rule, as represented by the Second, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, requires: (1) an independent violation of section 10(b); (2) the
aider and abettor's knowledge of the violation; and (3) substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the primary violation. 55 The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits articulate the
elements in a slightly different manner, requiring that the aider and abet56
tor knowingly and substantially assist in the primary violation.
50. Id. at 675-77.
51. Id.at 680-82 (citing Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir.
1965); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)).
52. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, reading substantially the same today as the Restatement of Torts did in 1939, provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977).
53. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); see,
e.g., Daniel R.Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL.
L. REv. 80, 84 n.29 (1981).
54. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1456 & n.1 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
55. See Landy, 486 F.2d at 162-63; see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Turtur, 892 F.2d
199, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1989); Walck v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 791 (3rd Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir.
1981); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1979). The Ninth
Circuit also uses this formula but additionally requires actual knowledge of the violation by
the aider and abettor. See Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 822 (1983).
56. See, e.g., Bane v. Sigmundr Exploration Corp., 848 F.2d 579, 581 (5th Cir. 1988);
Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Woods v.
Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir. 1985). Some commentators view the differ-
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The Seventh Circuit employs a stricter analysis than the other circuits.
Aside from requiring satisfaction of the three-pronged majority rule, the
Seventh Circuit requires as a threshold matter that the aider and abettor
possess the same level of scienter as the primary violator and that the aider
and abettor commit one of the manipulative or deceptive acts. 57 In Barker
v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt,58 the plaintiffs brought a claim
against an accounting firm and a law firm for aiding and abetting. The
Seventh Circuit granted summary judgment, stating that an aider and
abettor must meet the same standards as a primary violator but need not
59
actually sell the security.
B.

Aiding and Abetting Application Problems

No clear distinctions exist between primary and secondary liability in
the securities law context. Generally, plaintiffs sue the same person as
both a primary violator and as an aider and abettor, 60 and courts spend
minimal time analyzing the distinction. 61 At times, courts impose liability
62
based on both capacities.
Some courts distinguish between primary liability and aiding and
abetting liability by using a direct/indirect participant duality. 63 Under
this type of analysis, a primary violator directly participates in the fraud,
while a secondary violator only indirectly participates in the fraud. SEC v.
Coffey6 4 illustrates this distinction. In Coffey, the State of Ohio purchased
notes from an issuing company. 65 The SEC alleged the issuing company
made misrepresentations to the state and to a rating agency to achieve a
"prime" rating for the notes. 66 The SEC named the company's financial
vice-president as one of the defendants, and, in deciding whether to impose primary liability on the officer, the court examined whether the financial vice-president had direct contacts with the misled parties. 67
Courts occasionally base the distinction between a primary violator
and an aider and abettor on the role the person played in the transaction.
In DMI Furniture,Inc. v. Brown, Kraft & Co., 68 the court limited primary
ences between the Second, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits' test and the test applied by the
First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits as inconsequential. See, e.g., Joel S. Feldman, The
Breakdown of Securities FraudAiding and Abetting Liability: Can a Uniform Standardbe Resurrected?,
19 SEC. REG. L.J. 45, 73 (1991).

57. Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989); see LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986).
58. 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 495.
60. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 640.
61. Kuehnle, supra note 15, at 318.
62. See, e.g., Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 & n.5 (1983) (recognizing, but not discussing, the dual liability found by the trial court).
63. See Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1365 (5th Cir. 1988).
64. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
65. Id. at 1308.
66. Id
67. Id. at 1315.
68. 644 F. Supp. 1517 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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liability to actual buyers and sellers of securities, persons acting in roles
that statutes expressly specify as liable, or persons acting in roles that constitute an integral part of the statutory scheme. 69
The lines drawn in DM1 and Coffey do not offer valid distinctions because the text of section 10(b) covers "any person." 70 If "any person" can
"directly or indirectly" commit a primary violation, the distinctions fail to
separate sufficiently aiders and abettors from primary violators.
The Seventh Circuit limits primary liability to those persons otherwise
covered by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 7 1 Under this view, the court limits
primary liability to buyers, sellers, issuers of securities, the board of directors of the issuer, persons signing or preparing a prospectus, and any controlling persons. 72 As noted previously, the Seventh Circuit also requires
that the aider and abettor engage in a manipulative or deceptive act. Arguably, under the Seventh Circuit's approach, aiding and abetting liability
constitutes a mere label attached to accountants, lawyers, trustees, and
73
such whose actions constitute primary violations of section 10(b).
While some commentators and courts have suggested that no distinction exists between primary and aiding and abetting liability, others have
defined secondary liability in terms of duty. 74 Still others beg the question, describing a primary violator as one who commits acts directly proscribed by law and a secondary violator as one upon whom the court
imposes liability because of a relationship with the primary violator. 75 In
any event, the jurisprudence prior to Central Bank provided no clear or
meaningful distinction between primary and aiding and abetting
76
liability.
C.

Supreme Court Decisions in the ContractionEra

Courts developed private remedies and aiding and abetting liability in
the Expansion Era of securities law. 77 During this era, courts increasingly
69. Id. at 1519.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
71. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 494-95 (7th Cir.
1986).
72. See Mary T. Doherty, Note, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, 25 IND. L. REv. 829,
839-40 (1992) (arguing the Seventh Circuit's distinction is different from other circuits in
that it focuses on the defendant's role in the statutory scheme rather than his role in the

fraudulent scheme).
73. See id. at 852 (suggesting also that aiding and abetting has been all but eliminated in
the Seventh Circuit).
74. See, e.g., David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In PariDelicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597,

600 (1972) (classifying persons owing a duty to the public as primary violators).
75. See Kuehnle, supra note 15, at 318-20.
76. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 56, at 46 (contending that the distinction defies precise
definition).
77. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 648; see also Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent
Supreme Court Decisions Under the FederalSecurities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. LJ.891,

923 (1977) (arguing the Court has shifted its views on federal securities law from an expansion of implied rights during the Expansion Era to a more recent defendant-oriented
construction).
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formulated new private actions and remedies. 78 Beginning in 1975, the
Supreme Court entered a new phase in which its decisions began to limit
the doctrines developed during the Expansion Era. 79 The Court expressed concern over the implications of the expansive liability created in
the Expansion Era and began to restrict such liability.80 The ensuing
"contraction" period consequently resulted in courts rejecting new private
8
actions and criticizing the existing private actions. '
The Supreme Court's decisions during the Contraction Era demonstrate a recurring trend to look continually to the language of the statute
and the statutory scheme to ascertain congressional intent.8 2 This textual
approach to statutory construction differs dramatically from the original
approach used by the courts in recognizing private actions and aiding and
abetting claims. The difference in the two approaches caused courts and
commentators to question the validity of private actions based on aiding
83
and abetting.
The Court's securities law decisions in the Contraction Era can be
grouped roughly into three interrelated categories. The first category
consists of cases in which the Court considered whether a particular section implied a private cause of action.8 4 Cases in the second category dis-

78. See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468-69 (1969) (holding that a
merger involves both a purchase and sale and recognizing Rule lOb-5 application in a proxy
solicitation situation); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-34 (1964) (finding an implied
cause of action for violation of Rule 14a-9 and instructing courts to provide effective remedial
measures); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 (1963) (holding
scienter unnecessary in an SEC injunction proceeding under the Investment Advisors Act of
1940); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1974) (ruling that an
earnings forecast constituted a fact and allowing a lOb-5 claim based on such a forecast);
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 733 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding lOb-5 broad enough to include
negligence); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967) (allowing lOb-5
claims for all forms of fraud, not just traditional ones); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1967) (easing the buyer/seller requirement of 10b-5); Miller v. Bargain City,
USA, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (allowing an open market buyer to maintain a
lOb-5 suit based on false statements filed with the SEC); New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer,
225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (allowing a corporation to sue its officers and directors
for 101>5 violations and relaxing privity); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 24345 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (recognizing a 10b-5 violation by silence and dispensing with privity
requirement).
79. Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 648 n.64.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2090
(1993); Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102-04 (1991); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S.
723, 756 (1975).
83. SeeAkin v. Q-L Inv., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992); Benoay v. Decker, 517 F.
Supp. 490, 495 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Fischel, supra
note 53, at 91-96.
84. See generally Tamar Frankel, Implied Righs of Action, 78 VA. L. Rxv. 553 (1981) (providing a detailed analysis of the Court's decisions involving implied private remedies for securities violations).
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cuss issues concerning the extent of the prohibited conduct. 8 5 Cases in
the third category address aspects of the private liability scheme. 86
During the Expansion Era, the Court followed an enforcement rationale approach in deciding whether a particular section implied a private remedy. Under this rationale, the Court allowed private actions based
on the necessity of supplementing SEC enforcement of the statutory
scheme. 87 In Cort v. Ash,88 the Court restricted this enforcement rationale
and articulated a four part test for deciding whether an implied private
remedy existed. 89 Subsequently, the Court further narrowed the test and
articulated the dispositive inquiry as whether Congress intended to create
a private remedy. 90 This line of cases demonstrates a withdrawal from the
earlier tort law rationale of implied private remedies and highlights the
91
Court's focus on statutory construction.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeldey92 illustrates the second category of cases, in
which the Court considered the scope of the conduct on which a plaintiff
could base a cause of action. In Hochfelder, the plaintiffs premised their
cause of action on a theory of "negligent nonfeasance."9 3 While the plaintiff's complaint alleged the defendant had aided and abetted a violator of
section 10(b), the Court declined to address this issue. 94 The Court, relying on the language of the statute, ruled that a section 10(b) claim requires scienter. 95 Finding the language clear in the overall statutory
85. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983) (holding that a duty to disclose
does not arise from the mere possession of non-public information); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 691 (1980) (holding that the scienter requirement is the same for SEC injunctive proceedings and private party claims); Chiarela,445 U.S. at 228 (holding that nondisclosure
violates § 10(b) only when the defendant owes a disclosure duty to the plaintiff); Santa Fe
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1977) (holding that regardless of the fairness of the
terms, Delaware short-form mergers do not violate § 10(b) where there is full disclosure);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (requiring intent to deceive).
86. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 209192 (1993) (recognizing a right of contribution for § 10(b) violations); Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (imposing a reliance requirement on the plaintiff); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (denying the use of the in pari
delicto defense to liability); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733 (limiting standing to buyers and
sellers).
87. See, e.g.,J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (implying a private cause
of action under § 14(a) in order to supplement enforcement of the statutory scheme).
88. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
89. The four-part test established in Cort for implying a private remedy asks: (1) Is the
plaintiff a member of the beneficiary class of the statute?; (2) Is there any explicit or implicit
indication that Congress intend a private remedy?; (3) Is a private remedy consistent with the
legislative scheme?; and (4) Is the cause of action one of basically state concern typically
relegated to state law? Id. at 78.
90. "The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by
implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979).
91. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supranote 7, at 650-661 (analyzing the validity of aiding
and abetting liability under the Cort four-part test); Fischel, supra note 53, at 90-94 (discussing the validity of § 10(b) secondary liability under the Court's Contraction Era view); Frankel, supra note 84, passim (discussing the evolution of the Court's implied remedy analysis).
92. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
93. Id. at 190.
94. Id. at 193 n.7.
95. Id. at 201.
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scheme, the Court held that the text of the section controlled the
96
decision.
Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau97 illustrates
the third category of cases, in which the Court faced issues concerning the
procedural aspects of the private liability scheme. In Musick, the Court
considered whether defendants in a private section 10(b) action could
seek contribution from other defendants.9 8 The Court held in the affirmative, basing its decision on the overall statutory scheme. 99 The Court
stated that when faced with questions as to the individual components of
an implied private action, it must infer how the 1934 Congress would have
addressed the issue had the action been an express provision. 100 In making its inference, the Court announced its continuing goal to avoid "conflict with Congress' own express rights of action, to promote clarity,
consistency and coherence for those who rely upon or are subject to lOb-5
liability, and to effect Congress' objectives in enacting the securities
laws." 101 Musick demonstrates the Court's consistent use of the textual approach, even when it expanded the components of a private right of
action.
II.
A.

INSTANT CASE

Facts and ProceduralHistory

Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority (the "Authority") issued bonds in 1986 and 1988 with a total face value of $26
million.10 2 Central Bank, the petitioner, acted as an indenture trustee for
10 4
the bond issue. 103 Landowner assessment liens secured the bonds.
The bonds contained covenants requiring the value of the land subject to
96. Id.
97. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
98. Id. at 2086.
99. Id. at 2090-91. The Court looked first to the language of§ 10(b), but noted it "provides little guidance." I. at 2090. The Court next turned to sections 9 and 18 of the 1934
Act, stating that the sections were of "particular significance in determining how Congress
would have resolved the question" as the sections target the same dangers as § 10(b). Id. at
2090. The Court found sections 9 and 18 both to contain nearly identical rights of contribution, and thus inferred a right of contribution for § 10(b) defendants. Id. at 2091. In dissent,
Justice Thomas asserted that the majority's decision "unfortunately nourishes 'a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.' " Id. at 2092 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
100. "Our task is not to assess the relative merits of the competing rules, but rather to
attempt to infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue...." Id. at 2089-90.
101. Id. at 2090 (citation omitted); see also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737-44 (promoting clarity); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (effecting Congress's objectives).
102. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1443 (1994).
103. Id. An indenture, in the context of business financing, refers to a contract that establishes the terms of the bond issuance. BLAcK's LAw DiCnoNARY 770 (6th ed. 1990). An
indenture trustee performs duties specifically set out in the indenture and is only liable for
the performance of those duties. The indenture trustee thus has the duty to examine all
evidence to ensure it conforms to the requirements of the indenture. 15 U.S.C. 77ooo(a)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
104. CentralBank, 114 S. CL at 1443.
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the liens to be worth at least 160% of the total outstanding principal and
interest. 105
The covenants additionally required the developer of Stetson Hills,
AmWest Development, to provide evidence that the 160% threshold was
met each year. 10 6 The 1988 appraisal, provided in January, contained
land values virtually unchanged from the 1986 appraisals. 10 7 In contrast,
property values in the Colorado Springs area generally had declined over
the same period of time.108 Because of the conflict between the appraisal
and the general Colorado Springs real-estate market, Central Bank had its
in-house appraiser review the 1988 evaluation.1l 9 The in-house appraiser
concluded the 1988 evaluation appeared overly optimistic and recommended hiring an outside appraiser for an independent review of the
appraisal.1 10
After a series of letters, Central Bank agreed to postpone the independent evaluation until December 1988.111 By the time the 1988
bond issue closed in June, First Interstate Bank had bought $2.1 million
worth of the 1988 bonds.' l2 The independent review began in December,
but before completion of the review, the Authority defaulted on the 1988
113
bonds.
First Interstate sued the Authority, an underwriter, a junior underwriter, and a director of AmWest, alleging that the parties had violated
section 10(b). 1 4 First Interstate also sued Central Bank, alleging Central
Bank aided and abetted the other defendants in violating section
115
10(b).
The district court granted Central Bank's motion for summary judgment on the ground no genuine issue of material fact existed, holding
that allegations of recklessness did not satisfy the scienter requirement for
aiding and abetting. 116 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that reckless1 17
ness did satisfy the scienter element for an aiding and abetting claim.
The court of appeals did not consider the existence or validity of aiding
8
and abetting liability under section 10(b)."
Central Bank filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme
Court granted. 119 The original petition raised two issues: (1) whether an
indenture trustee can be liable for aiding and abetting if no duties have
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.

110. Id
111. Id
112. Id

113.
114.
115.
116.
Central
117.
118.
119.

Id
Id
Id.
See First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 900 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
thing, 969 F.2d at 903.
Id. at 898-904.
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993).
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been breached; and (2) whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement. 120 The Court, sua sponte, directed the parties to brief the issue of
whether a private party could bring suit based on a claim of aiding and
2
abetting.' '
B.

Majority Opinion

In the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held
that section 10(b) proscribes conduct involving manipulation or deception but does not proscribe aiding and abetting a primary violator.12 2 The
Court considered whether aiding and abetting fell under "the scope of
conduct prohibited," or whether it concerned the elements of a private
right of action. 1 23 The Court stated that determining the elements of the
section 10(b) private liability scheme poses difficult problems because the
statute fails to create expressly a private cause of action and provides no
guidance in regard to the elements of such a scheme.1 24 With respect to
the scope of conduct, however, the Court held that the text of the statute
25
controls any decision.'
Concluding that aiding and abetting constitutes conduct, the Court
turned to the text of section 10(b) and noted the language did not mention aiding and abetting.' 2 6 The Court explained that it had refused to
allow section 10(b) claims based on conduct not expressly proscribed by
the text of the statute and emphasized its continued adherence to the lan127
guage of the statute.
Respondent and the SEC argued the use of the phrase "directly and
indirectly" in section 10(b) demonstrated congressional intent to prohibit
aiding and abetting.' 28 The Court considered the statutory scheme of securities laws and rejected the argument, noting that Congress used such

120. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 61 U.S.L.W. 3463, 3464 (Jan. 5, 1993) (No. 92-

854).
121.

Central Bank, 113 S. Ct. at 2927.

122.

Central Bank, 114 S. CL at 1455.

123. Id at 1445. See generally supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text (discussing cases

that fall under the first and second prong of the analysis). Under the first prong, the text of
the statute controls the decision while under the second prong, the Court is required "to
infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the [private liability scheme] issue" had
an express private right of action for aiding and abetting been included in the 1934 Act.
CentralBank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446.
124. Central Bank, 114 S. CL at 1446.
125. Id
126. Id. at1446-48. "Our consideration of statutory duties, especially in cases interpreting
§ 10(b), establishes that the statutory text controls the definition of conduct covered by
§ 10(b). That bodes ill for the respondents, for 'the language of Section 10(b) does not in
terms mention aiding and abetting.'" Id. at 1447 (quoting Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae
8).
127. Id. at 1446.
128. Id at 1447.
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"directly and indirectly" language numerous times 12 and at no time did
130
such language consequently impose aiding and abetting liability.
After finding that the text of section 10(b) dictated the outcome, the
Court concluded that an analysis of the express rights of action granted by
the 1934 Act would reach the same result. 131 The Court found that while
some of the express causes of action in the securities acts specify categories
of possible defendants, none of the express causes of action in the 1934
Act proscribe aiding and abetting.' 3 2 The majority concluded that interpreting section 10(b) to proscribe aiding and abetting would create an
anomaly because such liability would not attach to any of the express pri33
vate rights of action in the Act.'
In addition to considering textual analysis, the Court considered
post-legislative history and policy arguments.' 3 4 The respondents cited
two post-legislative committee reports 135 the Court dismissed as containing only "oblique references to aiding and abetting liability." 13 6 Moreover, the Court stated the reports were merely an interpretation by a
Congress that was not responsible for passing section 10(b).1 37 The respondents, invoking the acquiescence doctrine, argued that congressional
silence demonstrated approval of aiding and abetting liability.13 8 The petitioner pointed out that Congress had rejected three prior proposed
amendments that expressly would have incorporated aiding and abetting
liability.13 9 The majority reasoned that the acquiescence doctrine 140 de129. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f) (2)(C) (1988) (addressing direct and indirect ownership
of stock); 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (2)-(3) (1988) (addressing direct or indirect interest in puts,
calls, straddles, or options); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78p(a) (1988) (addressing direct or
indirect ownership of securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988) (addressing direct or indirect control of person violating the Act).
130. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447; see also Fischel, supra note 53, at 95 n.83 (positing
that "[o]ne plausible interpretation of the 'direct or indirectly' language is that it allows
liability to be imposed upon a defendant even though such defendant does not himself use
the jurisdictional means (i.e., mail a letter in interstate commerce)"). But see In re Atlantic
Fin. Management, 784 F.2d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1986) (interpreting the "direct or indirect" language as encompassing principal/agent liability).
131. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448-49. In undertaking this analysis, the Court essentially
concluded that the same outcome would result under either prong of its test. Thus, the
Court's holding did not ultimately depend on the framing of the issue as "conduct" or as "an
element of the private liability scheme."
132. Id at 1449.
133. Id
134. Id at 1452-54.
135. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6043, 6044-45; H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1983).
136. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1452.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id. at 1453.
140. In addition to the "acquiescence doctrine," the Court addressed the "rejected proposal doctrine" and the "reenactment doctrine." See id. at 1450-53. "Acquiescence doctrine"
refers to a theory according to which judicial gloss obtains the force of legislation by congressional inaction. The "rejected proposal doctrine" posits that rejected proposals indicate that
courts cannot construe statutes to resemble the rejected proposals. The "reenactment doctrine" incorporates settled statutory construction when the Congress reenacts the statute
without disturbing the settled construction. For a summary of these doctrines as well as an
in-depth discussion on the dangers of using congressional inaction as an indication of legisla-
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served little weight and that the post-legislative history did not point to any
14 1
definitive answer.
The Court addressed policy arguments by considering the uncertain
and expansive litigation created by aiding and abetting liability and conceded the availability of policy arguments favoring aiding and abetting liability. 142 The Court, however, refrained from basing its decision on policy
rationales, stating that "policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and structure of the [1934] Act, except to the extent
that they may help to show that adherence to the text and structure would
143
lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it."
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburgjoined. The dissenters argued that the majority had given "short shrift to a long history of aider and abettor liability
under [section] 10(b)," 144 adding that every court of appeals to have con-

sidered the issue has upheld such liability.1 45 The dissenters argued that if
any confusion existed, it concerned the elements of aiding and abetting,
not its existence or validity. 14 6 The dissent further stated that the majority's rationale imperiled other firmly rooted theories of secondary liability
1 47
not expressly addressed in securities statutes.
In contrast to the majority's approach, the dissenters framed the issue
as whether a plaintiff has a right to sue a person who aids and abets a
primary violator.1 48 The dissent reasoned that because the 1934 Act had
been adopted against a backdrop of liberal construction in which "courts
regularly assumed ... that a statute enacted for the benefit of a particular
class conferred" the right to sue violators, section 10(b) should confer a
149
right of action against aiders and abettors.
Putting aside the liberal backdrop underlying the passage of the 1934
Act, the dissent argued that the doctrine of aiding and abetting liability
tive intent, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67
(1988).
141. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453. Here the acquiescence doctrine favored allowing
aiding and abetting liability, but the rejected proposal doctrine indicated the invalidity of
aiding and abetting liability. The Court noted that Congress had not reenacted § 10(b);
therefore, the reenactment doctrine did not bolster the respondents arguments. lI& at 1452.
142. Id. at 1453-54.
143. Id. at 1453-54 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)).
144. Id. at 1456 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1457.
147. Id. at 1456, 1460 n.12 (mentioning conspiracy, respondeat superior, and common
law agency principles).
148. The dissent argued the Court should uphold "the private right of action against aider
and abettors . .. [and follow] the traditional common law presumption, that a statute enacted for the benefit of a particular class conferred on the members of that class the right to
sue." Id. at 1456-57 (emphasis added). Thus, the dissent did not concern itself with whether
§ 10(b) proscribed aiding and abetting, but rather focused on a private plaintifFs right to
sue-a distinct and separate issue.
149. Id.
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had become so well established that the Court should not disturb it. 150
The dissent noted that federal criminal law imposes liability on aiders and
abettors of section 10(b) violators1 5 1 and argued that imposing civil liability on aiders and abettors would not place an unfair duty on those who
Congress has opted to leave unregulated. 15 2 While conceding that Congress, not courts, should create rights, the dissent argued that in this case,
the long history of aiding and abetting liability provided a secure founda153
tion for the imposition of liability.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Flaws in the Dissent's Rationale

The dissent's argument misses the point and ignores the statutory
construction goals of the modern Court. The liberal backdrop of the 1934
Act allowed private rights of action against persons engaged in conduct
proscribed by statute. Aiding and abetting liability, properly seen, does
not hinge on whether a plaintiff has a right to sue; rather, it focuses on
whether the defendant has engaged in conduct prohibited by the statute.1 54 Implying a private remedy redresses conduct prohibited by the
statute, while implying liability for aiding and abetting changes the proscription of the statute by expanding its scope. 155 In the first instance,
Congress has proscribed the conduct and the Court merely allows a remedy. In the second instance, the Court proscribes conduct and implies a
remedy. Thus, expanding the scope represents a greater usurpation of
Congressional power.
The dissent compounds its misconception of the issue by failing to
validate aiding and abetting liability under the rationale of Musick, Peeler
& Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau' 56 During the Contraction Era,
150. Id at. 1457-58.
151. Id. at 1459 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)). In response, the majority noted that the
Court has "been reluctant to infer a private right of action from a criminal prohibition
alone." Id. at 1455. The majority further pointed out the illogic of the dissent's argument by
stating "[ilfwe were to rely on this reasoning now, we would be obliged to hold that a private
right of action exists for every provision of the 1934 Act, for it is a criminal violation to violate
any of its provisions." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988)).
152. Id. at 1459.
153. Id. at 1460.
154. See Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). On their own accord, the
dissenters contend that the liberal backdrop confers "the right to sue violators of that statute."
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
155. See Fischel, supra note 53, at 93. The dissent consistently argues in favor of a plaintiff's right, but does not recognize that a private remedy redresses the wrong proscribed by
Congress.
156. 113 S. Ct 2085 (1993). At first blush, one might think the Court's decision in Central Bank directly conflicts with Musick as the former eliminates a form of secondary liability
while the latter provides for the right of contribution among violators of § 10(b). This contention fails to understand that the right of contribution established in Musick is the right of
contribution between persons jointly liable for the violation. I. at 2086. Thus, the right of
contribution established in Musick is not dependent on the existence of secondary liability.
See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text; Wiu.

L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW

OF TORTS § 50, at 309 (4th ed. 1971) (addressing contribution and the joint tortfeasor); Robert A. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. Rv. 130, 136 (1932)
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courts have used a textual approach in seeking out congressional intent
when implying a private remedy or defining the contours of such a cause
of action. 15 7 The statutory scheme of the 1934 Act weighs heavily against
imposing aiding and abetting liability.1 58 None of the sections of the 1933
Act or the 1934 Act expressly providing for a private cause of action imposes aiding and abetting liability. Additionally, where Congress did impose controlling person liability, a form of secondary liability, it provided a
good faith defense.1 59 The dissent undermines its rationale by failing to
address congressional intent and the negative implication of the statutory
scheme.
Moreover, the dissent erred by relying on the extensive history of aiding and abetting liability in the context of section 10(b) claims. This error
consists of two components: relying on congressional silence and relying
on settled lower court precedent.
Congressional silence, the passage of time, and agreement among the
courts of appeals does not add validity to an erroneous decision.1 60 When
61
Congress acts, it does so collectively and in an affirmative manner.'
Congress creates law by enacting statutes and cannot legislate without such
action. Thus, courts cannot reliably use the silence of Congress to infer
1 62
legislative intent.
(addressing contribution and equality); William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25
CAL. L. Rav. 413, 429-43 (1937) (addressing contribution and several liability).
157. See supra notes 77-101 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's Contraction Era decisions).
158. See Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 7, at 653 (asserting that both the negative
implication and post legislative history lead to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
impose aiding and abetting liability); Fischel, supra note 53, at 94-99 (arguing that both statutory scheme and legislative history indicate that § 10(b) does not impose aiding and abetting
liability).
159. See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969) (stating that "[Il]egislative silence is
a poor beacon to follow"; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). Aaron presented the
issue of whether the SEC had to establish scienter for an injunction to enforce Rule lOb-5.
Four years earlier, the Court had held that private parties must establish scienter, but lower
courts had interpreted the decision as not compelling a scienter requirement in injunctive
proceedings. The SEC built a strong acquiescence argument, but the Court responded by
stating, "it is our view that the failure of Congress to overturn the Commission's interpretation falls far short of providing a basis to support a construction of § 10(b) so clearly at odds
with its plain meaning." Id. at 694 n.ll; see also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501
U.S. 1083, 1104 (1991) (rejecting an acquiescence argument as to § 14(a) of the 1934 Act).
See generally Eskridge, supra note 140 (criticizing the use of congressional inaction as a form of
precedent).
161. See, e.g., U.S. Cowsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (stating that "[e]very Bill which shall have passed
the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to
the President of the United States"); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 946 (1983) (stating that bicameral enactment and presentation are "integral parts of the
constitutional design for the separation of powers").
162. "It does not follow.., that Congress's failure to overturn a statutory precedent is
reason for this Court to adhere to it." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175

(1989); see REED

DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES

181 (1975);

Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:Dipping into Legislative Histoy, 11 HorsTRA L. REv.
1125, 1133 (1983); Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 207, 214-15
(1917); John C. Grabow, CongressionalSilence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into
"Speculative Unrealities",64 B.U. L REy. 737 (1984); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construingthe Sounds of Congressionaland ConstitutionalSilence, 57 IND. LJ. 515
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The acquiescence of a subsequent Congress does not indicate the intent of the enacting Congress. 163 The Court has often stated that "views of
a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of
an earlier one." 164 "[E]ven when it would otherwise be useful, subsequent
legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its
enactment." 165 If the affirmative statements of a subsequent Congress do
not provide a meaningful basis for inferring legislative intent, the silence
1 66
of a subsequent Congress provides even less.
The parties in Central Bank advanced competing arguments based
upon post-legislative history. While the respondent argued that acquiescence and reference to secondary liability in committee reports weigh in
favor of allowing aiding and abetting liability, the petitioner argued the
rejected amendments that would have incorporated aiding and abetting
language into section 10(b) weigh against such liability. 16 7 In favoring the
acquiescence doctrine over the rejected proposal doctrine, the dissent
fails to support its decision with any reasonable rationale. The post-legislative history of section 10(b), at best, provides an inconclusive answer.
While all previous courts of appeals that considered the question may
have agreed that aiding and abetting liability existed, considerable confusion existed among the same courts regarding the proper application of
such liability.168 The confusion among circuit courts may stem from a
(1982) (approving only limited use of congressional silence as an interpretive tool). The
dissent's acquiescence argument would carry more weight if the Supreme Court previously
had upheld the validity of aiding and abetting liability, yet the Court had twice reserved for
decision the validity of such liability. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It". The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutor Stare Decisis, 88 MicH. L. REv. 177, 186-200 (1989) (contending that ignorance, inertia, interpretational ambiguity, and irrelevance make it difficult to infer congressional approval from congressional inaction); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Intrpretation-in the
Classroomand in the Courtroom 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 809-10 (1983) (suggesting that reliance
on post-enactment legislative materials usurps prior Congressional power without "going
through the constitutionally prescribed processes for repeal"); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L REv. 195, 205

(1983) (stating that "it is particularly risky to draw inferences from subsequent congressional
refusals to act").
164. See Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).

165. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13
(1980).
166. Grabow, supra note 162, at 750.
167. See supranote 139 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 56, at 72-73 (claiming that such confusion must eventually be addressed). Additionally, the dissent may have given "short shrift" to lower court
questioning of the validity of private actions based on aiding and abetting. See, e.g., id. at 7273 (claiming that such confusion must eventually be addressed). The dissent also may have
given "short shrift" to lower court questioning of aiding and abetting liability. See Akin v. Q-L
Inv., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that there is a "powerful argument that
...
aider and abettor liability should not be enforceable by private parties pursuing an implied right of action"); Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder Peabody
& Co., 800 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1986) (providing that courts have "frankly acknowledged
that, in light of recent Supreme Court cases, there is some ambiguity about the existence of a
civil cause of action for aiding and abetting"); Little v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 650 F.2d 218, 220
n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing that "[t]he status of aiding and abetting as a basis for liability

1994)

A4DING AND ABETTING

conceptual problem with the use of aiding and abetting in the section
10(b) context. The theory of aiding and abetting developed mainly from
criminal law and, to a lesser extent, tort law. 169 These areas of law mainly
revolve around physical acts. 170 The aiding and abetting concept in criminal and tort law rests on degrees of physical presence and action, which in
171
the physical context indicate culpability.
In the context of physical torts and crimes, one can rely on physical
presence and action to distinguish between primary violators and aiders
172
and abettors. In the securities context this analysis results in confusion.
Reliance on these antiquated doctrines results in irreconcilable conceptual problems and uncertainty in application. 1 73 The confusion and conflicting results in applying the aiding and abetting doctrine evidences this
lack of usefulness.
In the spirit of "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," the dissent argued that
the majority would stand on firmer footing if aiding and abetting liability
interfered with the effective operation of securities laws. 174 Such an approach ignores at least two adverse consequences of aiding and abetting
liability. The first problem becomes evident when comparing aiding and
abetting liability with "controlling person" liability. Sections 15 of the
1 75
1933 Act and 20 of the 1934 Act impose "controlling person" liability.
In addition, these sections provide for a good faith defense. To circumvent the use of the good faith defense, plaintiffs sought to impose aiding
and abetting liability instead of, or in addition to, controlling person liability. 17 6 This use of aiding and abetting frustrates congressional purpose by
under the securities laws is in some doubt"); Benoay v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 495 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (providing that "[i]t
is also doubtful that a claim for 'aiding and abetting' or
'conspiracy' will continue to exist under 10(b) [because Hochfelder] implicitly holds that aiding and abetting liability will not exist apart from liability for a direct violation"), aff'd, 735
F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Carlstedt, 101 F.R.D. 715, 722-23 (W.D.
Okla. 1984) (providing that "[t]he notion that aiding and abetting securities fraud constitutes ajusticiable violation of law is itself a questionable assertion"),rev'd, 800 F.2d 1008 (10th
Cir. 1986). Again, the dissent makes no attempt to validate its reasoning in light of the
confusion in the application of aiding and abetting liability.
169. Tort law does not fully embrace the concept of primary and secondary liability;, however, the concept ofjoint tortfeasance is widely accepted. This concept recognizes independent contributions to an indivisible tort, with each tortfeasor equally liable for the entire
harm. See Pollak, supra note 11, at 246-47.
170.

See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1989) (illustrating only physical harms

to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's property). The petitioner directed the Court's attention to
this point but the Court did not discuss the difficulties of importing a physical tort concept
into the economic arena of securities law. See Petitioner's Opening Brief 28 n. 20. Notably,
courts do not usually apply § 876 outside the context of physical torts except in § 10(b) cases.
4 BROMBERG & LOwENFELs, supra note 7, § 8.5(614) (4); see Herman & MacLean v. Huddle-

ston, 495 U.S. 375, 388 (1983) (claiming that securities law is not coextensive with common
law).
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1989); 2 WAYNE LAFAvE & AusIN W.
ScoTr, CiMINAL LAw § 6.2, at 495-98 (1979).
172. Ruder, supra note 74, at 621-22 (suggesting that tort law offers little or no help in the
securities context).
173. Feldman, supra note 56, passim
174. Central Bank, 114 S.Ct. at 1459.
175. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of the distinction between aiding and abetting liability and other
forms of secondary liability, see Sally T. Gilmore & William H. McBride, Liability ofFinancial

DENVER UN/VERS/TY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

allowing plaintiffs to prevent defendants' use of a good faith defense. By
eliminating the use of aiding and abetting as a basis for a section 10(b)
cause of action, the Court rightfully has prevented plaintiffs from circumventing the good faith defense provided by Congress.
A second problem with aiding and abetting liability arises when a private party bases a cause of action on silence. To recover from a primary
violator for silence, the plaintiff must show a duty existed and that he relied on that duty.1 77 A plaintiff could, however, bring an aiding and abetting claim based on silence and recover without showing either duty or
reliance. 178 This functionally allows plaintiffs to side-step the Court's restrictions on section 10(b) liability.
Efficient financial markets, while inherently chaotic, require a stable
and predictable legal foundation upon which they can rely. The inconsistent, ad hoc manner in which courts apply aiding and abetting liability
frustrates the market system. In the past, the resulting uncertainty has left
facilitators of financial markets unsure about the boundaries of permissible conduct and the scope of possible liability.1 79 Additionally, the uncertainty has resulted in defendants having to settle even the most frivolous
claims.1 80 These increased costs eventually flow to the investor.' 8 1 In the

Institutionsfor Aiding and Abetting Violations of Securities Laws, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 811,813814 (1985).
177. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 & n.9 (suggesting silence is
actionable only when a duty exists between the parties).
178. See, e.g., Doherty, supra note 72, at 851-52 (concluding that an aider and abettor can
be found liable for failure to disclose despite absence of duty). Courts focus on a defendant's
intent in a claim based on silence, rather than on duty. Tort law, however, does not require
intent as an element of an aiding and abetting claim. PatrickJ. McNulty & DanielJ. Hanson,
Liabilityfor Aiding and Abetting by Silence or Inaction:An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J.
14, 39-43 (1993).
179. Feldman, supra note 56, at 73.
180. Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr. & Michael J. Norton, ProfessionalAdvisors: "Am I My Brother's
Keeper?",23 COLO. LAw. 1795, 1795 (1994). Because of the uncertainty surrounding § 10(b)
claims, the defendant often chooses to pay a settlement rather than run the risk of an adverse
judgment. See, e.g., 2 Louis Loss, SEcurmEs REGULATIONS 1792 (2d ed. 1961) (relatively few
IOb-5 cases go to trial on the merits); Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider TradingRestrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 27 n.129 (1980) (plaintiffs have an incentive to bring groundless and
contrived claims because of the likelihood of settlement as opposed to adjudication);
Thomas M. Jones, An EmpiricalExamination of the Resolution of ShareholderDerivative and Class
Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REv. 542, 545 (1980) (presenting the results of a study showing
that only 2.3% of the litigated shareholder claims resulted in judgment for the plaintiffs).
181. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, PayingLawyers, EmpoweringProsecutors, and ProtectingManagers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DuKE L.J. 945, 962-65 (1993) (discussing the
effects of unnecessarily raising the cost of capital). "When a corporation pays ajudgment or
a settlement, the value of the corporation's stock may fall and its cost of capital rise. In that
event, not only do shareholders sustain a loss, but the productivity of the firm may declineat some cost to the society." Frankel, supra note 84, at 577-78.
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end, the beneficiary 182 of the statute pays the cost of the uncertainty, a
1 83
result which frustrates congressional purpose.
B.

Majority's Rationale

The majority's approach follows the textual analysis laid out in its previous Contraction Era decisions. Instead of treading upon the "quicksand" of the acquiescence doctrine, 184 the majority directs courts to look
at the text of the statute and the statutory scheme to ascertain congressional intent. While this approach does not result in absolute precision, it
allows participants in the financial market to predict adequately the scope
of the statute. 185 This predictability will minimize unnecessary costs in financial markets and thereby benefit investors.
The Court's decision establishes a two-prong analysis for deciding issues presented by the implied private remedy litigation under section
10(b). If the Court faces a question as to the components of a private
cause of action, it will decide the issue based on congressional intent as
ascertained from the overall statutory scheme. If the Court faces a question as to what conduct a party can base a private cause of action on, it will
turn to the text of the section at issue. While the second prong involves a
fairly simple analysis, the first prong may cause hesitation because the
Court is forced to infer how the enacting Congress would have decided
186
the issue.
This approach will help prevent securities law from becoming loosejointed because it focuses on consistency and conformity with the overall
statutory scheme. The dissent's rationale would allow erroneous lower

court precedents to flourish. The majority's statutory construction analysis curbs the growth of unintended secondary liability and leaves policy
decisions to Congress.
C.

Possible Ramifications

Plaintiffs and courts often used aiding and abetting as a "misnomer,"
labeling the defendant as an "aider and abettor" when "primary violator"
would more accurately describe the defendant. 187 Since the inception of
182. Some economists have concluded that empirical evidence does not support the belief that investors have benefitted from securities regulation. SusAN M. PHiuiPs &J. RIcHARD
ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC IN'rEnxsr (1981); GeorgeJ. Benston, RequiredDisclosure and

the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am. EcoN. REv. 132
(1973); Greg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security
Issues, 24J.L. & ECON. 613 (1981); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets,
37 Bus. LAw. 721 (1964). For a general discussion of the economics of regulation, see STEPHEN

BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM

(1982).

183. See Akin v. Q-L Inves., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992).
184. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940).
185. While the textual analysis will not allow participants to predict flawlessly the application of a statute, it does assure participants that courts cannot impose liability for a violation
not expressly stated in the statute.
186. In considering the scope of conduct prohibited, "the text of the statute controls our
decision." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446.
187. Akin, 959 F.2d at 526.
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aiding and abetting liability, courts have seldom sought to make a meaningful distinction between aiders and abettors and primary violators.1 88
The majority in Central Bank concedes that courts need not apply the
scope of primary liability narrowly.1 89 As a result, courts and litigants will
now begin to flesh out the limits of primary liability.
Opponents of the Court's decision in CentralBank claim the decision
will permit fraudulent conduct to run rampant.19 0 These opponents believe that Central Bank will immunize lawyers, accountants, bankers, and
other similarly situated parties from liability for fraudulent conduct. 19 1
This fear ignores the main focus of the Court's decision: to violate section
10(b), the defendant must have committed some fraudulent act. If an
accountant, lawyer, banker, or any other party fraudulently provides an
investor with false information, the investor can bring suit against that person as a primary violator.' 9 2 Most likely, the Court's decision will act to
exonerate only those persons who did no vouching or played no role in
the falsifying itself. 193 Thus, the decision does not give the "green light"
to fraudulent action but instead forces plaintiffs to allege and subsequently prove fraud on the part of the defendant.
While the Court's decision probably will not disturb the implied private cause of action for violations of section 10(b),1 94 it casts doubt on the
validity of other forms of judicially imposed secondary liability under section 10(b) such as respondeat superior, agency, and conspiracy. 195 At the
outset, it would seem that the Court's decision jeopardizes all of these
188. See supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
189. "Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under lOb-5, assuming all of the

requirements for primary liability under Rule 101>5 are met." Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
190. Senator Metzenbaum stated that CentralBank "gives clearly fraudulent behavior the
green light." 140 CONG. Rac. 59460 (daily ed. July 21, 1994).
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1991)
(finding allegations against preparer of an offering circular sufficient to survive motion for
summary judgment without relying on an aiding and abetting analysis); SEC v. Washington
County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that primary liability does not require face-to-face contact).
193. However, prior to the Central Bank decision courts hesitated to impose aiding and
abetting liability when the defendant did "not engage in conduct that intentionally misleads
or lulls a victim." IX Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4486 (3d ed.
1992). Also, aiding and abetting liability remains a potential theory in private actions based
on state securities law violations. See generaly Douglas M. Branson, CollateralParticipantLiability Under State Securities Laws, 19 PEPP. L. Rv. 1027 (1992). Plaintiffs' counsel often may seek
remedies in state courts due to the Supreme Court's decisions restricting private actions
under the federal securities laws. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAw § 7.03,
at 133 (1989).
194. The existence of a private cause of action is "simply beyond peradventure." Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). But see Michael J. Kaufman, A Little
"Right" Musick: The UnconstitutionalJudicial Creation of Private Rights of Action Under Section

10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 287, 297-335 (1994) (arguing that the
implied private cause of action under section 10(b) is unconstitutional).
195. See, e.g., A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619, 624 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding a brokerage firm can act only through its agents and is accountable for the actions of its officers);
Harrision v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425, 1431 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussing
respondeat superior liability in the § 10(b) context); Eastwood v. National Bank of Com-
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forms of secondary liability, yet a distinction may exist between conspiracy
and the two other forms of secondary liability mentioned above. Conspiracy, similar to aiding and abetting, imposes liability based upon conduct
(an agreement to engage in proscribed conduct). Respondeat superior
and agency represent a more vicarious form of liability based on a relationship between the primary violator and those with the burden of secondary
liability.19 6 Both respondeat superior and agency are more akin to "controlling person" liability and therefore courts might view them as more
consistent with the statutory scheme. If so, conspiracy liability would not
survive while respondeat superior and agency would be fertile claims. It
appears unlikely, however, that courts would chose to utilize this
19 7
distinction.
CONCLUSION

The continuing strict textual approach applied by the majority in Central Bank injects a degree of certainty and clarity into the complex area of
securities law. The Court's rationale provides securities attorneys and
their clients with a meaningful basis from which they can determine the
scope of permissible conduct and potential liability. Contrary to the opinion of some alarmists, the Court's decision does not give a "green light" to
fraudulent conduct but rather forces courts to more carefully consider the
culpability of defendants. 198
Paul Dmitri Zier

merce, 673 F. Supp. 1068, 1079-81 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (discussing conspiracy liability for a
§ 10(b) violation).
196. While the terms secondary liability and vicarious liability are often used interchangeably, the notion of vicarious liability would be limited more properly to liability based on
relationships rather than liability based on conduct. See Kuehnle, supra note 15, at 318 n.28.
197. Central Bank echoes the substance of Justice Kennedy's concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part opinion in VirginiaBankshares. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Moreover, it would seem more onerous to allow judicially created forms of liability such as
respondeat superior and agency to be applied when Congress's intent was to impose controlling person liability. See Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1978);
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-86 (3d Cir. 1975).
198. No longer will investors be able to "have their cake and eat it, too" as they will not be
able to recover from advisors on an aiding and abetting theory if the investment loses money
for any reason. See Lidstone & Norton, supra note 180, at 1796.

